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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The questions can be answered only by the federal courts. This
is exactly the point. The range of cases that can plausibly be
argued, to the Supreme Court if necessary, on the basis of "civil
rights" is limited only by the imagination of counsel and his sense
of ethics. A uniform federal policy may emerge as a result of the
legislation, but a means of delay is now readily available to all who
would use it. Future events must be weighed. If the balance is
uneven because abuse becomes widespread it is to be hoped and
expected that the scope of the statute will be limited by legislation
or judicial action.
ROBERT A. MELOTT
Securities Regulation-Rule 10b-5-A Federal Corporations Law?
The plaintiff, a corporate director, brought a derivative action
in a federal district court against six of his co-directors, alleging a
violation of rule lOb-5. 1 This rule makes it unlawful for any person
to use any instrumentality of interstate commerce or any facility of
the securities exchanges to (1) "employ any device, scheme, or arti-
fice to defraud," or (2) "to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact... or" (3) "to engage in any
act.., or course of business which ... would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security."2 The defendants allegedly sought to perpetuate their
control by causing the corporation to issue treasury stock to one of
the defendants individually or to a third person who would vote the
stock as directed by the defendants. The fraudulent aspects of the
117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1958).
2 The entire rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
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issuance were the alleged withholding from the board of the latest
financial statements, the arbitrarily ascribed value of the stock, and
the postponement of the annual shareholders' meeting. The plain-
tiff sought to have the issuance enjoined, but the action was dis-
missed on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter.3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Runkle v.
Roto American Corp.,4 reversed, finding the plaintiff had alleged a
claim for relief over which the district court had jurisdiction.
While the history of rule lOb-5 has involved critical questions
of interpretation and application,5 it has evolved as the major anti-
'Jurisdiction is provided in § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958):
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive juris-
diction of violations of this chapter or the rules . . . thereunder ....
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chap-
ter or rules . . . may be brought in any such district or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business,
and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
found. ....
In the principal case, the lower court's decision to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction was based upon Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.?d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952). What the court probably meant was that the plaintiff had
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court
undoubtedly had jurisdiction of the subject matter under Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946), since the plaintiff had stated a claim arising under
the laws of the United States. The court of appeals could therefore have
reversed the dismissal purely on the jurisdictional question without reach-
ing the merits of the case. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§
17-19 (1963).
"CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91455 (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 1964).
The problems initially encountered by the courts where whether or
not the rule provided a private right of action and whether or not the rule
afforded the purchaser this right of action. The courts found that a private
right of action was implied by the rule. Kardon v. National Gypsum Corp., 73
F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964), the Supreme Court held that a private right of action was implied
under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 893, 15
U.S.C. § 78a (1958), (proxy solicitation provision) and thereby eliminated
any remaining doubts in this area. The private right of action was predi-
cated on the principles set forth in RESTATMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934).
See generally 3 Loss, SEcuRiTIEs REGULATION 1682-1861 (2d ed. 1961);
Ruder, Civil Liability Under Ride 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intentt?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 627 (1962); 61 HARv. L. REv. 858 (1948);
Comment, 32 TEXAs L. Rrv. 197 (1953); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120
(1950). The courts then held that the private right of action was not only
afforded to the seller but also to the purchaser. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Although the purchaser's private right of
action was broadly based on public policy, it had theretofore been thought
that the purchaser's rights were exclusively vested in the other provisions
[Vol. 43
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fraud remedy for both purchasers and sellers of securities. The
requisite elements of a lOb-5 action are far fewer than its common
law counterpart of fraud and deceit.' The essential requirements
are a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact and detri-
mental reliance' on such by the party bringing suit. The transac-
tion must have used, either directly or indirectly, an instrumentality
of interstate commerce, 9 e.g., a telephone,10 the mails, or the facilities
of a securities exchange, and must have been "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." The security involved need
not be a stock or bond, for the act's definition of "security" is
exceedingly broad."
of the 1933 and 1934 acts. But the court in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd in part, revd in part, 188 F.2d
783 (2d Cir. 1951), held that even though the plaintiff had a right under
§ 11 of the 1933 act, when there was added the ingredient of fraud, then
the action could be maintained under lOb-5 whether or not he could main-
tain a suit under § 11 or some other provision of the act. See Ellis v.
Carter, supra. Another pressing problem was that of the statute of limi-
tations, since neither § 10(b) of the act nor the rule provided for one.
But it has been held that the statute of limitations for the state in which
the court is sitting is applicable to 10b-5 actions. Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
814 (1961); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Connelly v.
Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959). The courts have further
held that the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and laches are available to the
defendant. See Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th
Cir. 1962). See generally 73 YALE L.J. 1477 (1964). Note that it is still
significant that the private right of action is predicated in tort. See Crist
v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 136 (D. Colo. 1964), where
the court held that a private right of action under lob-5 cannot be trans-
muted into an action on a contract, express or implied, which will sustain
attachment against a resident defendant, even though restitution rather than
a damage remedy was sought.
*At common law the elements of deceit were (1) a false representa-
tion of (2) a material (3) fact; (4) the defendant must know of the
falsity (scienter) but make it, nevertheless, for the purpose of inducing
the plaintiff to rely upon it, and the (5) plaintiff must justifiably rely
upon it to his (6) damage. For a comparison between the common law ele-
ments and those of rule 10b-5, see 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1431.
'Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); In the Matter of
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See generally 3 Loss, op. cit.
supra note 5 at 1430-44.
' See Howard v. Furst, 283 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 973 (1957); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
Cf. Kremer v. Selheimer, supra note 7.
0 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
10 See Fratt v. Robinson, supra note 9.
'x See Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1958).
It provides that the term "security" includes such things as any note, stock,
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In Roto the requirement "in connection with the purchase or
sale" takes on particular significance since there was only an
issuance of treasury stock involved. The court reasoned that the
issuance of stock by the corporation was a sale for the purposes of
10b-5. However, in early 10b-5 litigation this would have indeed
been a novel idea.' 2 The argumentum against the equation of sale
to issuance was based upon the SEC's power to regulate. The basis
of the power was two-fold: (1) to regulate in the interest of the
public and (2) to regulate for the protection of the investor. The
argument asserted that the corporation was not an investor in its
own stock and, therefore, the rules were not promulgated for its
protection.:" The courts rejected this in favor of the public policy
grounds of regulation, which were found to encompass protection to
an issuing corporation.14 The principle of equating an issuance to a
sale is now firmly established. The courts have given the corporation
standing to effectuate the protection by permitting it to bring the
action itself and by allowing derivative actions. The court in Roto
recognized a necessity for this standing by stating:
Barring suit by a corporation defrauded under those circum-
stances would, as a legal and practical matter, destroy any remedy
against the perpetrator of the fraud. Suits by individual share-
holders would either run afoul of the privity requirements ...
or result in smaller recoveries .... 15
The privity requirement referred to by the court has been a
source of judicial controversy since its introduction as a requisite
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights, or any in-
terest or instrument commonly known as a security.Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 814 (1961).
28 Ibid.
"Ibid. Hooper is apparently the first case extending 10b-5 protection to
an issuing corporation. The court said:
It greatly expands the protection frequently so hemmed in by the tradi-
tional concepts of common law misrepresentation and deceit, the require-
ment of privity, proof of specific damage, inadequacy of the right of
rescission or right to recover up to par value of stock of a much greater
market value.
282 F.2d at 201. The inadequacy of a common law remedy and the proof
requirements were the prime reasons for extending the protection. For
other cases implying a private right of action for the issuing corporation,
without discussing the problem, see New Park Mining Co., v. Cranmer,
225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217
F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
" CCH FED. SEc. L. Rr. 91455, at 94769. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 43
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to a private right of action. It was first interjected when the court
in Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.6 unfortunately
stated:
A semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser of the
security in connection with which the improper act, practice or
course of business was invoked seems to be requisite and it is
entirely lacking here.1 7
The privity with which the court was there concerned was privity
of contract. In other words, for a private right of action to exist, the
misrepresentation or omission must have been that of either a pur-
chaser or seller and not that of a third person. The doctrine of
privity prohibited either the purchaser or seller from suing a third
party if he was not an immediate party to the transaction."8 How-
ever widespread the necessity of privity became, it is now fairly
apparent that it is no longer requisite to a private right of action
under 10b-5.'1 Today, privity is generally recognized as an eviden-
tiary fact to be considered in conjunction with other material facts
in determining whether the duty created by 10b-5 was breached.20
However, there is a trend towards its total rejection for any pur-
pose.21 The courts adopting the trend permit a suit by either pur-
chaser or seller against any party making a misrepresentation, even
though he was not a party to the immediate transaction. The ques-
tion of privity was not before the court in Roto, but its references
99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
99 F. Supp. at 706. (Emphasis added.)
"The courts, in an effort to lessen the effect of privity and to extend
the scope of lOb-5, permitted a charge of conspiracy to sweep in peripheral
defendants. It is only necessary, therefore, for the plaintiff to prove that
one of the defendants was in privity with him, either as a purchaser or a
seller. See, e.g., Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Thiele v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
"o See New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas Con-
tinental Life Ins. Co., v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); H. L. Green
Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
" Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. .207, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
"1 See cases cited in note 19 supra. The proclivity of the courts toward
privity is lucidly shown in Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp.
33 (E.D. Pa. 1964), where the court, in making the latest pronounciamento
on the privity requirement, said: "I find it unnecessary to attempt a definition
of this, at best, cloudy phrase, for if 'a semblance of privity' means 'privity'
(like 'a little bit pregnant'), I reject it." Id. at 37.
1965]
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to privity as a requirement and to Farnsworth apparently mean that
it rejects the present trend. Such a result will not afford the investor
the maximum protection against any person who has defrauded him
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Although Roto did not reject the privity requirement, it did
reject, for the purposes of this case, and perhaps for all lOb-5
actions, the doctrine that the directors constitute the corporation.
The rejection was out of necessity, for otherwise the result would
have been that the corporation had defrauded itself. The result is,
of course, justifiable since it prohibits directors from taking advan-
tage of their fiduciary capacity. Roto is not clear as to the per-
centage of directors who voted in favor of the issuance, but it is
fair to assume that a majority so voted. If such actually was the
case, the court's rejection of the doctrine seems to require a con-
ceptualistic realignment of fictions, for it has been held in other
contexts that board action is corporate action."
Roto is not important because it expands the interpretation of
any single element of a 10b-5 action, but rather because it exempli-
fies the widening application of the rule to acts of corporate mis-
management and breaches of fiduciary duties. The growing latitude
of application is succinctly stated by the court:
It is no answer simply to state that the federal security laws are
not concerned with corporate mismanagement or breaches of
fiduciary obligations. That Congress could not or did not attempt
to resolve all corporate ills, does not mean that it chose to leave
without the federal sphere problems basic to the entire regulatory
system.23
This statement in juxtaposition with the corporation's standing to
sue and the rejection of privity by other courts gives rise to the
implication that 10b-5 is more than an anti-fraud rule; it is a sub-
stantive federal corporations law.24
The idea of a federal corporations law based on 10b-5 was re-
jected in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.25 In that case the ma-
jority shareholder of Newport sold his controlling interest to Wilport
Co. at a premium, making misrepresentations to the minority share-
2 See, e.g., Baltimore & 0. R.R., v. Foar, 84 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1936).
28 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91455, at 94769. (Emphasis added.)
" See Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corpora-
tions by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964).
"' 98 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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holders of Newport about a previous offer from another company.
The minority shareholders alleged that the misrepresentations con-
stituted a violation of IOb-5. The court, instead of finding a viola-
tion, took the narrow approach that the rule was aimed only at a
fraud perpetrated on the buyer or seller and had no relation to
breaches of fiduciary duty resulting in fraud on the minority."8 This
approach was taken before the introduction of privity, and one
commentator27 has concluded that the privity requirement as repre-
sented by Farnsworth was nothing more than an effort to keep the
question of corporate mismanagement in the state courts.
Notwithstanding Birnbaum and the privity requirement, the
limits of application of lOb-5 have greatly expanded. The duty of
disclosure under 10b-5 has been applied to the "insider," traditionally
a director, officer, or controlling shareholder.2" But the SEC in In
The Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.29 rejected the "insider" concept
as a limit to the duty to disclose and instead rested the obligation of
disclosure 0 upon two principal elements:
" For another approach to this case, see Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1955). For a discussion of corporate opportunities, see 74
HAR v. L. Rsv. 765 (1961).
" Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 725,
786 (1956). See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1763-70.
See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
2040 S.E.C. 907 (1961). For comments on this case, see 30 U. CHaI. L.
RFv. 121 (1962); 71 YALE L.J. 736 (1962). The defendant in this case
was stock brokerage firm. One of the members was also the director of a
corporation listed on an exchange. Immediately after the corporation
voted to reduce its dividend, the director-associate relayed the information
to the defendant. Aware of the dividend reduction, defendant sold the stock
of the corporation held in discretionary accounts before news of the re-
duction reached the exchange. When news of the reduction did reach the
exchange, a decline in the market resulted. Failure to disclose the reduction
to the purchaser was found to be a violation of lOb-5. Here, there was no
intent to defraud, since normally the news would have already reached the
exchange except for the unexplained delay in communication.
"°In Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951),
the court's rationale foreshadowed that of the SEC in Cady, Roberts, but
seems to have been limited to the "insider" concept, which was rejected by
the Commission. The court said:
The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stock-
holder, to purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing
material facts affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority
stockholder by virtue of his position but not known to the selling minority
stockholder, which information would have affected the judgment of the
sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing
a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage
of the uninformed minority stockholder.
Id. at 828-29. The test as to what information need be disclosed seems to
19651
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[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.
3 1
The SEC found that the anti-fraud provisions were not intended
as a specification of particular acts of fraud, but rather as an encom-
passment of an infinite variety of forms and devices used to take
advantage of investors. The expansion of the duty to disclose seems
justifiable since it affords maximum protection to the investor.
Expansion in yet another direction is represented by New Park
Mining Co. v. Cranmer,32 where an insider took advantage of oppor-
tunities rightfully belonging to the corporation. Here, a corporation
sued a director, alleging three separate violations of the rule, each
involving a separate transaction. In the first transaction, the de-
fendant was negotiating the acquisition of stock in a new venture
for the corporation. Instead of acquiring all of the offered stock for
the corporation, he was able to appropriate for himself a sizeable
portion without consideration. The court found that this was a
fraud on the corporation because the defendant's acquisition propor-
tionately reduced the value of the shares acquired by the corporation.
In the second transaction the defendant induced a third party to
acquire mining leases, which had been offered to the corporation,
in the names of the third party and of the corporation. Again the
corporation furnished the sole consideration, and was defrauded by
purchasing the third party's interest for 40,000 shares of its own
stock, of which 11,000 went to the defendant. Within the same
time scope, the corporation was allegedly defrauded by its purchase,
at an inflated price, of its own stock from another third party. This
purchase was facilitated by the defendant. Both acts in the second
be inherent in Speed, viz., that information which would affect the judg-
ment of either the buyer or seller. At common law there was a duty to dis-
close "special facts" which used essentially the same test implied in Speed.
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). The test should apply a reasonable
man standard in determining which facts would affect the judgment, other-
wise it becomes subjective and allusive. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963). See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1456-66;
62 MicH. L. REv. 880 (1964).
8140 S.E.C. at 912.
* 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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transaction constituted a single violation of 10b-5. In the third trans-
action, the corporation was allegedly defrauded by the defendant's
failure to disclose to the corporation the fact that the defendant was
to have an interest in a venture that the corporation was to enter with
another company. The corporation lost a considerable amount of
money in exploration of the proposed venture, which proved to be
worthless. The court found that the agreement to purchase the half
interest was itself a purchase for the purposes of 10b-5. Note that
in none of the transactions did the defendant deal directly with the
corporation. The court said of the entire sequence of events:
A purchaser or seller of stock is not limited under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to an action against the other party to the pur-
chase or sale; he can sue a third party if in connection with the
purchase or sale that person defrauded him.... It is immaterial
whether the purchase or sale was part of a larger scheme of
corporate mismanagement if the elements of a claim under Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are otherwise present. 33
The court was apparently willing to take cognizance of the entirety
of each transaction and not merely the 10b-5 violations. It is doubt-
ful that the court was willing to decide every appendant issue, since
the court was uncertain whether the money spent in exploration in
the third transaction was sufficiently connected to the 10b-5 violation
to permit recovery for the loss. This uncertainty implies that the
court was willing to apply a test of proximity, but it is difficult to
ascertain the degree of proximity necessary to justify deciding an
appendant issue.
Another approach generally taken in this area is that of in-
voking the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,3 4 which permits a
federal court to decide non-federal claims when the non-federal
claim arises out of the same cause of action as a federal claim.35
This has traditionally meant that the federal and non-federal claims
constitute nothing more than a shift in the theory of recovery.
The difficulty with this approach lies in the fact that not all acts
of corporate mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty can
be said to arise out of the same cause of action as that arising from
" Id. at 266.
8 Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933).
"' Ibid. See generally WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 19, 78; 62 CoLum.
L. REv. 1018 (1962).
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the violation of the rule, and the courts would not have jurisdiction
of such claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.80
A third view would be to consider the acts of corporate mis-
management, in which the elements of lOb-5 are present, as "basic
to the entire regulatory system," and therefore, covered by the
rule itself. 7 Thus, once the elements of lOb-5 have been established,
the court will be able to decide all of the collateral questions without
the restriction imposed by pendent jurisdiction. The merits of
this view are the relative ease of deciding the jurisdictional prob-
lems and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation. The basis of this
view is in the assertion that lOb-5 is a federal substantive corpora-
tions law. Such an assertion is supported by Roto, and by the fol-
lowing language which foreshadowed Roto:
It creates many managerial duties and liabilities unknown to
the common law. It expresses federal interest in management-
stockholder relationships which theretofore had been almost
exclusively the concern of the states.... Section 10(b) provides
stockholders with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fi-
duciary duties. It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act ...
constitutes far reaching federal substantive corporation law.88
This approach represents a substantial change of attitude from
that expressed in Birnbaum, which now stands only for the propo-
sition that third parties cannot assert claims based upon a sale or
purchase to which they were not a party. 9 How much greater the
lattitude will become for calling collateral problems "problems basic
to the entire regulatory system" is open to speculation.
That 10b-5 has become a federal substantive corporation law
is apparent. Whether or not the rule itself is a sufficient basis for
such law is open to serious debate. At this stage in its expansion,
it would seem appropriate for the courts to apply at least a quantum
of restraint before the body of law developing appurtenent to
the rule, for deciding the collateral issues, becomes too encom-
" See, eg., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Wolfson v.
Blumberg, 229 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" It is possible to state this in another way, namely, that a breach of
fiduciary duty is a genus of fraud which the courts are willing to treat
under the anti-fraud provisions, even though not traditionally considered a
"fraud." Cf. S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180
(1963).
8' McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 939 (1961).
" See Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
[Vol. 43
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passing. If, in view of the growth of large interstate corporations
and the basic structure of the American economy, a federal corpora-
tions law would be advantageous or desirable,4 then it is for Con-
gress to so provide.
THOMAS C. WETTACH
Torts-Implied Warranty-Privity
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions reject the require-
ment of privity of contract between the consumer of a product and
the manufacturer in an action on an implied warranty.' In Terry v.
Double Cola Bottling Co.,- North Carolina retained its rule requiring
privity. The court there affirmed a compulsory nonsuit in an action
against the manufacturer where the plaintiff's evidence showed
that she had purchased from a lunchroom, an intermediate seller,
a bottled drink allegedly containing a green fly.3 However, Justice
Sharp, in a thorough concurring opinion,4 attacked the food manu-
facturers' fortress of privity under the present North Carolina law
and urged the court to adopt the majority rule. This case presents
the question: is it necessary to abandon the privity requirement in
order to provide adequate remedies for an injured consumer or
ultimate user?
At common law, the courts required privity of contract in a
negligence action against the manufacturer.' However, when man-
ufacturers began making extensive use of distributors and retailers
to peddle their products to the public, the courts realized the in-
justice of this requirement.' The initial onslaught began in Mac-
"0 Some of the obvious advantages would be in the relative ease of obtain-
ing service of process, the jurisdictional requirements, and the most im-
portant would be that of uniformity. For the problems appendant to 10b-5
as a corporation law, and its effect on such things as the stock market, di-
rectors, etc., see Ruder, supra note 24.
'Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sonier), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). Dean Prosser stated that no state has
adopted this privity requirement since 1935 but many have rejected it. Id. at
1110.
263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754.
'Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754. Justice Sharp concurred because she found
a lack of evidence that the fly was in the bottle when it left the defendant's
control.
'Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842).
' See generally Prosser, supra note 1.
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